Abstract-The paper is devoted to the analysis of the network protection mechanism "nervous network system" based on the bio-inspired metaphor. Packet-level simulation is proposed in order to investigate the "nervous network system" protection mechanism. We describe the architecture of the protection system based on the given mechanism, its operation algorithms and present results of the experiments. Using obtained results the efficiency of the protection mechanism "nervous network system" against infrastructure attacks is analyzed.
INTRODUCTION
Nowadays the number of attacks on computer infrastructures is constantly increasing. They have become more targeted -large companies, public institutions and critical infrastructures such as dams, nuclear stations are under attack. Besides it is often reported about network worms and bots that generate large volume of traffic when spreading, overloading communication channels. Thus, the necessity of the research in network protection against infrastructure attacks (DDoS, worms, DNS attacks, attacks against routers, etc.) is clearly seen. One of the prospective approaches of the network protection is a "nervous network system" which is an example of bio-inspired approaches. This approach embodies a metaphor of the human nervous system. The concept of "nervous network system" was offered by Y. Chen and H. Chen [3] . This protection mechanism is based on a set of distributed information collection and processing techniques which help to identify attacks, coordinate the operation of the main network devices, and implement counter-measures. The similar approach called "electronic nervous system" was suggested by B. Gates for internal communication and operation management of enterprises. The protection mechanism similar to "nervous network system" was also considered by F. Dressler [6] and K. Anagnostakis [1] .
When designing and implementing new security systems such as the "nervous network system", it is necessary to have efficient tools for their development, testing, analysis and adaptation. The research of infrastructure attacks and protection mechanisms against them is rather complicated and robust process. To implement infrastructure attacks large quantity of hosts united in one network is required. Infrastructure attacks are very dangerous, as in case of their implementation the computer network can fail; and therefore it is impossible to observe such important conditions of scientific experiment as controllability and repeatability. Thus, simulation methods for analysis of infrastructure attacks and protection mechanisms seem to be the most preferable solution. The simulation provides a flexible mechanism for modeling complex dynamic systems that allows experimenting with different sets of parameters and scenarios, spending much less efforts, than in real networks.
In this paper it is suggested to use the packet level simulation for analysis of the "nervous network system" approach. The description of protection mechanism structure, its operation algorithms are given, the results of experiments are represented. The main contribution of the paper is the investigation of peculiarities of the "nervous network system" protection mechanism by its design, implementation and experimental analysis. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II considers related bio-inspired approaches. Section III presents main principles of "nervous network system" protection. In section IV we suggest the architecture of this protection mechanism. Section V describes the implemented simulation testbed. Sections VI and VII outline the experiments fulfilled and their results' evaluation. Finally, section VIII presents main conclusions and future work directions.
II. APPLICATION OF BIO-INSPIRED APPROACHES
FOR COMPUTER NETWORK PROTECTION Protected computer systems should have the possibility to interact with each other, react quickly on a danger, and recover themselves from the damage. Automation is one of methods that allow responding quickly on arising threats. As the majority of modern attacks are carried out in the automatic mode it is necessary to treat them before they can cause damage to target system. The model of the human protection system could be used for development of automatic reaction mechanisms. For example, at the top level the human being is protected by skin which possesses such properties as physical protection against penetrations. The mechanisms of detection and early notification about dangers (tactual sense), antibacterial and antifungal protection are used. At the penetration points of the organism, such as mouth, eyes, nose, ears, there exist also mechanisms that resist various threats: mucus and mast cells act as filters and traps; tactual and taste senses are detection and notification subsystems, while saliva and tears possess antipathogenic properties. The internal human protection system can be divided into two levels: local one that functions directly on a certain site, and the general one, that covers all body of the human and acts via blood, lymphatic and nervous systems.
F. Dressler [6] uses an analogy with live cell to construct the mechanism of computer network protection. Data is transmitted locally from cell to cell; a signal irritates cell receptor that leads to the response reaction, which influences on the surrounding cells. On the basis of this metaphor the traffic scanner is constructed. It sends collected data to intrusion detection system that analyses it and updates firewall security rules if necessary.
K. Anagnostakis et al. [1] offer the cooperative protection mechanism against viruses named COVERAGE (Cooperative to virus response algorithm), based on immunology. They attempt to implement such properties and mechanisms of the immune system of a living organism as adaptability, decentralized architecture, communication mechanisms. They also try to optimize the cost of packet scanning and filtering procedures for virus detecting.
S. Forrest and S.Hofmeyr [7] propose the approach based on the concept of an immunocomputing and negative selection. The component that implements this approach operates by analogy with antibodies that destroy all alien objects in the body of human. All events and objects are divided into two groups "own" and "alien" to create the space model of objects and (or) events. In order to define precisely whether object is "own" or "alien" it is proposed to use detectors that react only on "alien" objects.
There are a lot of other works on bio-inspired approaches for computer network security. In this paper the approach called "nervous network system", initially proposed by Y. Chen and H. Chen [3] , is studied in details. The protection mechanism based on this approach uses distributed information collecting and processing techniques which coordinate main network devices, identify attacks and implement counter-measures.
III. "NERVOUS NETWORK SYSTEM" METAPHOR The studied approach is based on the main principles of the human nervous system and therefore it is called "nervous network system" [3] . The nervous system transpierces the human body and acts as information collecting, transferring and processing system, producing responses on different irritants. The structure of the approach repeats the structure of human nervous system and therefore it is distributed, i.e. there is no a unified control center which coordinates actions of the whole network. The protection system consists of the components of the two main types: servers and nodes. The servers implement the major part of information processing and analysis and can be set in different subnets; they also coordinate the operation of neighboring network devices. Nodes are used to collect, process and transmit the initial information and can operate on the basis of routers. The servers located in different subnets exchange information about their subnet state (Fig. 1) .
Thus, the metaphor of "nervous network system" is used to build adaptive network infrastructure that provides information gathering, its transmission to special servers and supports decision-making according to the current situation.
To provide information security, the IFSec (infrastructure security) protocol [3] is used. The IFSec is a new protocol that protects network infrastructure. It operates at the network level (level 3) and supports secure information exchange between domains, as well as routers between the servers in one domain. The IFSec is constructed over IP and functions transparently to transport packets of the high level protocols.
The IFSec protocol provides three levels of communication. The lowest level specifies communication between routers of one domain in order to control the state of the network. The second level determines communication between routers and the server located in one domain. At the highest level the server communicates with servers located in other domains. Thus, the IFSec protocol operates on three layers. The layer 1 is used for communication between nodes. The layer 2 implements interaction between nodes and their server. The layer 3 unites servers from different domains. Besides, servers communicate with the general network via IPSec protocols.
Internet providers often use different security policies; also they do not want their competitors to know the state of their networks, available limits of traffic capacity even if they operate under the agreement of joint protection against DDoS attacks. The layer 3 of the IFSec protocol helps to solve the privacy problem on the policy level. It is rather simple and easy for implementation scheme of trust management. Using it the IFSec allows providers to unite efforts for protection against DDoS attacks. The providers can define what private information is accessible to other systems.
The architecture of the system based on "nervous network network" can be represented as follows.
The domains of the network which are connected to "nervous network system" form an overlay network and communicate between each other via the VPN channels established between specialized security servers (Fig. 2) .
The routers, located in different parts of the network, interact not only with each other, but also with their domain specialized security server.
The Functionality of this architecture can be described at two levels:
x Local processing of obtained information by separate devices; x Information processing within distributed cooperation of providers. The appointed security process is implemented locally on each node. Largescale cooperation is fulfilled to implement protected information exchange in the domain (from a router to a router, from a router to the server), as well as between domains (from the server to the server). In this case information is automatically distributed between different nodes of the network (Fig. 3) . Timely obtained information allows to respond on different external threats more effectively.
Each node consists of functional blocks with the standard interface for data exchange. This provides flexibility when updating and maintaining nodes dynamically.
As the idea of this model arose from the analogy to the human nervous system, the cooperation of the distributed nodes occurs similarly to the reaction of the human nervous system. Single nodes function not only as executors, but also as sensors.
Apart from the general protection which is implemented by nodes independently, they also provide results of data analysis to other nodes and security servers.
Security servers have two roles. Firstly, they operate as coordinators, sending control signals to the nodes in their domains. Secondly, they work as distributors, receiving useful information from nodes in the domains and transmitting it to other security servers.
The metaphor of "nervous network system" describes the main properties of the nervous system by defining mechanisms of information exchange, attack detection and response. There exist systems that use similar construction and functioning principles, for example the concept of autonomic computing [2] . In this section the general architecture of the "nervous network system" is considered (Fig. 4) .
In a subnet 1 there is a server of the "nervous network system". It is connected with the servers of the "nervous network system" located in other subnets. Each server is connected with the local nodes of "nervous network system". Besides, each node communicates with other nodes of "nervous system" located in one subnet. Interactions between all nodes and servers in the network are defined by different levels of the IFSec protocol. Thus, there are two main architectural components -servers and nodes. They are discussed in more details in the rest of the section.
The server consists of the following modules: the modules of data exchange with slave nodes and servers located in other subnets; decision support and reaction module; database. Information flows in the server component of the "nervous network system" are shown on Fig. 5 .
The data exchange modules are connected to the decision support and reaction module and send information about network events to it. The decision support and reaction module controls them by sending responses and commands. The database is a storage of the data received from external sources; it is connected to the decision support and reaction module and deliver it previously obtained information. The decision support and reaction module consists of the modules of prioritization, correlation, data exchange with other servers and local nodes, as well as the database exchange module and the decision-making module (Fig. 6) . The data received from both data exchange modules are processed by the prioritization module that defines data priority according to the established security policy. These results determine the sequence of actions implemented by downstream modules.
Then data are transferred to the correlation module that chooses events according to their priority and requests similar events from a database using the database exchange module. The correlation module compares the sets of events and evaluates the threat level. Then the module of making blocking decision defines the response on the current danger according to the established policies and thresholds. If it is necessary these data are sent to servers and nodes of "nervous network system". Information about chosen decision and the current threat level is recorded to the database. Let us discuss the prioritization module algorithm in details. If received data contain suspicious IP addresses, they get the highest processing priority; other suspicious packets receive lower priority, while data from unknown sources are rejected.
After the prioritization the correlation module processes data. If the module is not busy (by processing other data) it chooses data with the highest priority and searches in the server database addresses that could be potentially used for attacking legitimate nodes. If suspicious address was already noticed in similar activity, threat level of this address is increased. If there are no high priority tasks the module identifies attack source.
The set of algorithms for local attack tree construction, global attack tree construction and traffic blocking procedure is used to detect the attack source. We adopted the change aggregation tree (CAT) algorithm [4] to build local attack tree. The server gathers the information about detected anomalies in the following way. Firstly the node that triggered attack is checked if there are low level nodes. If such node exists the current node is connected to it as vertex, otherwise the current node is considered as the root node and the search of high level nodes which detected the same attack is implemented. If high level nodes are found, they are connected to the local attack tree as vertexes.
The server of the "nervous system", when it receives data from a remote server, operates as follows. When the server receives signals about a detected attack from the neighboring subnets it constructs the global tree attack. Firstly the server checks, if it has its own local attack tree. If a local attack tree is not empty server checks whether its subnet is the attack target. This is done by comparing the destination IP addresses of the malicious packets with the IP address range of the given subnet. If the given subnet is the attack target, the server tries to unite its local tree with trees of neighboring subnets. These trees form a first radius of the attack. Then the server connects trees of the subnets that border with the first radius subnets and so on. If the server subnet is not an attack target, the server defines a subnet that receives malicious traffic and sends the local attack tree to the corresponding server.
Then the traffic blocking procedure is carried out. The module checks if the suspicious IP address exceeds the defined threshold, and if it exceeds the decision on blocking the attacking host address is made. This decision is spread among all slave nodes and remote servers of the "nervous network system".
The node of the "nervous network system" contains the following components (Fig. 7) : traffic processing module, data exchange module, signature and correlation rule database.
The node fulfills initial traffic processing that is implemented during several stages. On the first stage the flow distribution module distributes information flows according to the sender IP address. Then the classification module determines the packet types. The analysis and countermeasure selection module is connected to the database which is used when the module analyses the processed traffic. If the module identifies traffic as malicious it sends this information to the attack counteraction module which in its turn delivers it to the server and nodes, receives responses from them and updates signature and correlation rules in the database if necessary. The legitimate traffic is allowed into the network.
The architecture of the analysis and countermeasure selection module is presented in Fig. 8 . The packets from the classification module are transferred to the rule analyzer that can block traffic according to the filtering rules.
Then traffic goes through the traffic anomaly analyzer and the signature analyzer. If any module decides to block traffic, a packet is transmitted directly on the traffic blocker bypassing downstream (subsequent) filters. The traffic blocker deletes the packet in case of the positive decision and reports about malicious package to the attack counteraction module. If the packet is identified as legitimate it is returned to the network. If the node detects malicious traffic, it sends a message to its server. The message contains the following fields: the router identifier, its condition, the malicious flow identifier (for example, IP addresses of the sender and receiver), the identifier of the packet source router, the identifier of a packet receiver router, the quantity of routers at the high level, the quantity of routers at the low level and the router condition.
V. SIMULATION TESTBED
To assess the efficiency of the "nervous network system" a packet-level simulation testbed was created. It is based on the modeling framework described in [9, 10] . The simulation testbed architecture has four main components and includes the basic components of the "nervous network system", the simulation models of infrastructure attacks and protection mechanisms in the form of application models (Fig. 9) .
The lower level is a basic simulation module. It is a simulation system based on discrete events. To simulate the Internet components and protocols, the Internet simulation module is used. It contains the components to generate the network topologies, the models of network applications and protocols. It uses also the library ReaSE, designed to simulate computer networks realistically representing the Internet. The subsystem of basic components of the "nervous network system" is a library that contains the components of the "nervous network system" and the general scenarios of the behavior implemented in the form of service and application models which are embedded in the models of computer network nodes. The module of domain processes includes the components of attacks and defense mechanisms, as well as the modules that implement the node functionality, including the filtering table, packet analyzer, models of legitimate users, etc. In the module of domain processes we specified the models of network worm propagation (including vulnerable node) and DDoS attacks. We chose the techniques based on FC [5] , VT [16] , HCF [8] , SIM [14] , SAVE [11] , SYN detection [15] approaches as basic protection mechanisms against infrastructure attacks and specified in the module of domain process the simulation models of these mechanisms as well as the protection mechanism based on "nervous network system".
When experimenting only with the basic protection mechanisms, they are installed on all routers. When using the "nervous network system" approach, the basic protection mechanisms were connected to servers of the "nervous network system". In both cases parameters of the computer network and the attack mechanisms were the same. This allowed us to compare the efficiency of the "nervous network system" with the basic protection mechanisms.
To carry out experiments, the network consisting of 3652 nodes was used. Ten of these nodes were servers. Among server nodes there were three web servers, one DNS server and six mail servers. 1119 nodes (this is almost 30% of all nodes) had vulnerabilities that were necessary for successful network worm penetration, the same nodes were used to realize DDoS attacks.
VI. EXPERIMENTS
The implemented experiments could be divided into two stages -efficiency assessment of the proposed protection mechanism against network worms (the first stage) and distributed DoS attacks (the second stage).
For simulation of network worm propagation we made an assumption that some network hosts have vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the network worm. We assumed that the network worm uses the TCP protocol to spread and random scanning of IP addresses in given range to locate target hosts.
To counteract the worm propagation, the protection mechanisms FC and VT were chosen as basic. When the "nervous network system" mechanism is switched on, these mechanisms are coordinated by the responsible server of the "nervous network system".
When FC mechanism is carried out independently, it counts up the number of packets with the switched-on the RST flag in the unit of time. If the number of such packets is higher than an established threshold, the host which receives the majority of such packets is blocked for a period by the local protection mechanism that has detected the attack. If the FC mechanism is connected to the "nervous network system", it sends data about nodes defined as the attack source to the local server of the "nervous network system".
The server spreads the information about the detected attack among other servers of the "nervous network system" which in their turn send commands to the corresponding protection mechanisms in order to block traffic from attacking hosts and change threshold values for detecting malicious hosts. This is the major difference between the usages of protection mechanisms independently and united by "nervous network system". Fig. 10 demonstrates the number of infected hosts without any protection and the number of infected hosts depending on the chosen protection mechanism: FC mechanism installed on all routers (FC-100%), VT mechanism installed on all routers (VT-100%) and FC protection mechanism managed by "nervous network system" (NSS-100%). It is clearly seen that in case of usage of FC mechanism managed by "nervous network system" the quantity of the infected hosts decreases almost by 20% compared to the FC mechanism and approximately by 10% compared to VT mechanism respectively. Figure 10 . Number of the infected hosts depending on protection mechanism used (FC-100%, VT-100%, NSS-100 % or without protection)
To simulate DDoS attacks, we chose SYN Flooding and Ping Flooding attacks. In the half of the experiments we implemented sender IP address spoofing. To protect the network the mechanisms based on SAVE, Hop-Count Filtering and SIM were used. The same protection mechanisms were used in conjunction with the "nervous network system". Let us discuss some protection mechanisms.
The SAVE mechanism is set on a core router of a local subnet and allows identifying packets with spoofed address. When receiving a packet from an internal network, the SAVE checks, whether the sender's address fits the range of the local network addresses. If it doesn't, the packet is rejected. Thus, the propagation of malicious packets to external networks is blocked.
The SIM protection mechanism can function in two modes -in the training mode and in the protection mode. In training mode the database of trusted IP addresses is filled up. Every new IP address is retrieved from the traffic, then the SIM checks, how many packets were received from this address. If their quantity is greater than N, N > 2, this IP address is written in the trusted IP address database, otherwise it is rejected. Simultaneously the SIM monitors the number of connected clients per a time unit. The exceeding of the given threshold can indicate the beginning of a DDoS attack, and in this case the protection mechanism switches from the training mode to the protection mode. The packets received from the hosts which addresses absent in the trusted IP addresses database are filtered.
When the SIM is connected to the "nervous network system", in the protection mode SIM sends host addresses which are not present in trusted addresses database to the corresponding server of "nervous network system". The local server distributes data about attacking nodes to other servers of the "nervous network system" which in their turn send the SAVE modules the command to block packets sent by attacking hosts.
Thus, when operating independently, security mechanisms apply their own algorithms for attack detection and blocking. When they are included in the "nervous network system", they not only implement their own detection mechanisms, but also send information about attacks to the corresponding server of the "nervous network system" and wait for the server response (commands) if no appropriate rule, signature or policy found.
VII. EVALUATION OF PROTECTION MECHANISMS
In this section the quality of the proposed "nervous network system" approach is estimated using the basic quality metrics such as false positive rate (FP), false negative rate (FN), true positive rate (TP), true negative rate (TN) and the additional metrics such as recall, precision, accuracy, mistake and F-measure.
The "nervous network system" protection is compared to the basic and alternative cooperative protection mechanisms. We use the following additional metrics. Recall, r is defined as the ratio of correctly classified packets to the total number of malicious packets: r = TP/(TP+FN). Precision, p is calculated as the ratio correctly classified malicious packets to number of the all packets classified as malicious: p = TP/(TP+FP). Accuracy, a is defined as the ratio of correct decisions made by system to the total number of decisions made by system: a = (TP+TN)/(TP+FP+FN+TN).
Error, e is calculated as the ratio of wrong decisions to total number of decisions made by system: e = (FP+FN)/(TP+FP+FN+TN). F-measure, F i is often used as general metric that unites recall and precision metrics:
We use also security metrics that characterize overall efficiency of protection mechanisms. When evaluating the protection mechanisms against network worms the number of infected hosts (N inf ) is used. In case of DDoS attacks the volume of the malicious traffic coming on the attacked host (V mal.traffic ) is assessed. The metrics that characterize the operation of basic protection mechanisms and the "nervous network system" mechanism (NNS) against network worm propagation are presented in Table I . Note that in this case "nervous network system" uses FC mechanism as the attack detector. Table I shows that the protection mechanism FC managed by the "nervous network system" demonstrates better performance results in comparison with others when considering F-measure and number of the infected hosts.
The metrics that characterize the operation of basic protection mechanisms and the "nervous network system" mechanism against DDoS attacks are shown in Table II .
As the "nervous network system" mechanism uses cooperation mechanisms to protect computer network against infrastructure attacks, it is necessary to compare the efficiency of the proposed mechanism with other cooperative protection mechanisms. We chose the cooperative protection mechanisms COSSACK [13] , DefCOM [12] and the mechanisms based on a multi-agent approach, described in [10] . In order to assess the efficiency of the protection mechanisms we evaluated the volume of the malicious traffic coming to the attacked host. As the chosen cooperative protection mechanisms are designed to be used against DDoS attacks solely we estimated only the efficiency of protection mechanisms against DDoS attacks. The results of the comparison are presented in Table III . According to them the protection mechanism based on the "nervous network system" turned to be more effective. It is worth noticing that due to high complexity of the development of cooperative multi-agent protection mechanisms, their models weren't implemented in simulation system, and percentage of the filtered traffic was borrowed from [10] therefore this comparison can't be absolutely precise as the experiments were carried out in different systems, though with similar conditions.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we offered to use the protection mechanism "nervous network system" which is intended to counteract against infrastructure attacks. We proposed one of possible system architectures that implement such protection mechanism, and described its main operation algorithms. To estimate the efficiency of the proposed protection mechanism, we developed the simulation testbed and carried out a set of packet level simulations. The implemented experiments showed the effectiveness of the basic security mechanisms managed by the "nervous network system" against such infrastructure attacks as network worm propagation and DDoS.
The presented paper shows the possibility of application different biological metaphors for network protection against infrastructure attacks. Certainly, not all biological approaches can be implemented today completely. However, many of them may be viable and give a new impetus to development of perspective information security systems.
Our next research steps will be devoted to improvement of the suggested approach and its experimental evaluation.
